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Processing scalar implicature: What can individual differences tell us?
Abstract
There is much current debate about processing scalar implicature, but a considerable body of empirical
evidence seems to support the idea that it requires additional time and effort on the part of the hearer (e.g.
Breheny, Katsos and Williams 2005, Bott and Noveck 2004 and many others). The goal of this study was to
contribute to our understanding of the cognitive processes that go on as comprehenders process sentences
with and without scalar implicatures. We conducted a visual-world eye-tracking experiment using a picture-
verification task, with a novel single-picture display, and asked participants to indicate whether the picture
they saw was a good description of the sentence they heard. As a whole, our results suggest that processing
scalar implicatures does appear to entail a processing cost. In this paper, however, we take a closer look at a
pattern which has also been obtained in several previous experiments (e.g. Noveck 2001, Noveck and Posada
2003), namely, the tendency for participants to split into two distinct kinds of responders in the presence of
underinformative descriptions. An example of an underinformative description is “Some giraffes have long
necks”, which is not a sufficient description of the reality that all giraffes have long necks.
Existing research suggests that adults respond to underinformative sentences either using a consistent logical
interpretation (e.g. “some” always means “some and possibly all”, and thus “Some giraffes have long necks” is
judged to be true) or a consistent pragmatic interpretation involving a scalar implicature (e.g. “some” always
means “some but not all”, and thus “Some giraffes have long necks” is judged to be false). Although it is widely
assumed that participants’ answers reflect their on-line processing (i.e., a logical response means that no
implicature was computed, a pragmatic response means that the implicature was computed), our data suggest
that participants are aware of scalar implicature regardless of how they respond to underinformative sentences,
and in some cases, greater processing can be demonstrated for participants who answer “logically”. We further
suggest that the emergence of participant response groups may be due to participants’ sense that they should
be consistent within an experimental context, rather than a difference in how underinformative items are
interpreted.
This working paper is available in University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics: http://repository.upenn.edu/pwpl/
vol16/iss1/24
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Erin Tavano and Elsi Kaiser 
1  Introduction 
Scalar implicature refers to a phenomenon first introduced in Grice (1975), which proposed sev-
eral Conversational Maxims describing rules which conversational participants obey as part of 
their normal efforts to be understandable and helpful. The research presented in this paper focuses 
on the Maxim of Quantity, which exhorts speakers to “make your contribution as informative as is 
required (for the current purposes of the exchange)” (Grice, 1975:45). Though this instruction 
seems aimed toward the speaker, in Grice’s view it is also crucial for conversation that the hearer 
bear it in mind. If the hearer believes that the speaker has uttered something that is obviously less 
than fully informative, but has made his or her contribution as informative as possible, then the 
hearer may assume that the speaker has created an implicature. That is, the speaker expects the 
hearer to draw an inference that some obviously more informative utterance does not apply.  
 This idea has been formalized by Horn (1972), who introduced the idea of Horn scales. These 
are sets of lexical items that can be ordered such that one is regularly “above” the other in terms of 
informativity, and the higher item entails the lower item.  Horn scales include <all, some>, <hot, 
warm>, <huge, big> and so on; if something is hot, then it is also warm. If a speaker says that 
something is “warm”, then the hearer might reasonably infer that the speaker has intentionally 
avoided the higher term “hot”, and that the item is therefore not hot, or at least the speaker does 
not have evidence to say that it is.  In this situation, the hearer has processed the speaker’s scalar 
implicature, from the scale <hot, warm>.  
 There is much current debate about processing scalar implicature, but a considerable body of 
empirical evidence seems to support the idea that it requires some time and effort on the part of the 
hearer (e.g. Breheny, Katsos and Williams, 2005; Bott and Noveck, 2004; but see Grodner, Klein, 
Carbary and Tanenhaus, 2008 for a different view). To further investigate the time course of proc-
essing scalar implicature, we conducted a visual-world eye-tracking experiment using a picture-
verification task (see Tavano & Kaiser, to appear for details). By using a single-picture display 
and asking participants to indicate whether the picture they saw was a good description of the sen-
tence they heard, we aimed to contribute to our understanding of the cognitive processes that go 
on as comprehenders process sentences with and without scalar implicatures. As a whole, our re-
sults suggest that processing scalar implicatures does appear to entail a processing cost, at least 
when involving visual contexts of the kind that we looked at. 
 In the present paper, we take a closer look at a particular aspect of our findings, namely the 
tendency for participants to split into two distinct kinds of responders, a pattern which has also 
been obtained in several previous experiments. More specifically, a number of researchers have 
noted that adults often split in how they respond to underinformative sentences (Noveck, 2001; 
Noveck and Posada, 2003; Foppolo, 2007). An underinformative sentence is one that uses the 
lower lexical item on a Horn scale where the higher one would be more appropriate. One example 
from Noveck (2001) is “Some giraffes have long necks.” In reality, all giraffes have long necks, 
so the use of “some” is underinformative.  
Existing research suggests that adults respond to underinformative sentences either using a 
consistent logical interpretation (e.g. “some” always means “some and possibly all”, and thus 
“Some giraffes have long necks” is judged to be correct) or a consistent pragmatic interpretation 
involving a scalar implicature (e.g. “some” always means “some but not all”, and thus “Some gi-
raffes have long necks” is judged to be incorrect). Note that the pragmatic interpretation is the one 
which requires the scalar implicature to be computed (i.e., the speaker said “some” and thus meant 
“not all”). In addition, researchers have often observed a difference in response times between the 
two interpretations, with the pragmatic interpretation being slower than the logical interpretation. 
The slowdown associated with the pragmatic interpretation is standardly analyzed as indicating 
increased processing cost associated with scalar implicature (e.g. Noveck, 2001; Noveck and 
Posada, 2003). On the whole, previous research has assumed that participants’ answers reflect 
their on-line processing (i.e., a logical response means that no implicature was computed, a prag-
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matic response means that the implicature was computed). However, previous authors have had 
little to say as to why some participants seem to consistently opt for the logical interpretation while 
others consistently opt for the pragmatic interpretation. Additionally, previous research did not 
directly investigate whether participants’ off-line pragmatic vs. logical responses provided a reli-
able indication of whether they were computing the implicatures. In particular, one might ask 
whether participants who provide logical answers were actually failing to compute the implicature, 
or whether they computed it but nevertheless opted to respond in a logical manner. 
Our data suggest that participants are aware of scalar implicature regardless of how they re-
spond to underinformative sentences, and in some cases, greater processing can be demonstrated 
for participants who answer “logically”. We suggest that the emergence of participant response 
groups may be due to participants’ sense that they should be consistent within an experimental 
context, rather than a difference in how underinformative items are interpreted. 
2  Previous Experiments 
The present study joins others in using the visual-world eyetracking paradigm that investigate the 
real-time processing of scalar implicature (Storto and Tanenhaus, 2005; Huang and Snedeker, 
2009; Grodner, Klein, Carbary and Tanenhaus, 2008). With the exception of Grodner et al., the 
results of the other eye-tracking studies suggest that scalar implicatures induce an increased proc-
essing cost. Because our main focus in this paper is on the split into pragmatic and logical re-
sponders, and because these studies did not report any differences in participant consistency, we 
will not focus on their results here (for a review, see Tavano and Kaiser, to appear). However, it is 
important to note that the participants in these experiments all ultimately responded according to 
an interpretation that incorporated the scalar implicature, as was required by the nature of the ex-
periment. 
Other studies ⎯ such as Noveck (2001) ⎯ found that participants tend to split into pragmatic 
responders and logical responders. Noveck (2001) tested children’s and adults’ interpretation of 
“might” and “some”. With “might”, the logical interpretation is “might be and possibly must be”, 
and the pragmatic interpretation is “might be but does not have to be”. With “some,” the logical 
interpretation is “some and possibly all”, and the pragmatic interpretation is “some but not all”.  
Noveck’s results show that children were far more likely to give logical responses to underinfor-
mative scenarios containing “might” or “some”, than adults, who tended strongly towards prag-
matic responses. When adults were faced with an underinformative condition, e.g., having to ac-
cept/reject a statement such as “there might be a parrot in the box” in a situation where there must 
be (Noveck’s Experiment 1), Noveck found that adults accepted such a sentence on only 35% of 
the trials. In other words, only 35% of adult responses agreed with the logical “might be and pos-
sibly must be” interpretation. In contrast, children showed a stronger preference for the logical 
response, with the strength of the preference modulated by the age group.  
Noveck (2001) obtained a similar pattern of results with a slightly different task (requiring a 
truth judgment on sentences like “Some giraffes have long necks”, his Experiment 3). Adults 
again showed an overall preference for pragmatic responses; only 41% of adult responses agreed 
with the logical “some and possibly all” interpretation. As before, children showed a stronger 
preference for logical responses. Noveck attributes these results to adults’ overall greater process-
ing ability, suggesting that it allows adults, but generally not children, to compute the scalar 
implicatures that are needed to generate the pragmatic response.   
However, Noveck’s adults were not uniform in their response patterns. In Experiment 1, 6 of 
19 (32%) consistently responded logically and 13 of 19 (68%) provided consistently pragmatic 
responses. The division in Experiment 3 was not as strong; 5 of 15 (33%) consistently responded 
logically and 6 of 15 (40%) pragmatically, with the remaining 4 equivocating between pragmatic 
and logical responses. In light of Noveck’s claim that the pragmatic responses are produced due to 
greater adult processing capacity, these split results raise the question of whether the logical-
response subset of adults simply has insufficient, child-like processing capacity. In a follow-up to 
this study, Noveck and Posada (2003) suggest an explanation in terms of Relevance Theory: it 
may be the case that not all adults have the same threshold for deciding what input is likely to be 
informative enough to be worth their processing efforts. Under this view, the logical-response 
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adults are not necessarily child-like, but possibly just a bit stingier with their processing effort. 
Noveck and Posada (2003) conducted an ERP study on implicature processing, evaluating 
both response time and the N400 brainwave response. The N400 wave indicates semantically 
anomalous stimuli; a larger N400 response indicates greater perceived anomaly. Participants were 
asked to give truth judgments on several types of sentences, including obviously true sentences, 
obviously false sentences, and underinformative sentences like “Some elephants have trunks” (un-
derinformative because, of course, all do). 
Noveck and Posada again demonstrated a split among their participants with regard to the in-
terpretation of “some”. Similar to Noveck (2001), there were more pragmatic responders than 
logical responders: Twelve of 19 participants (63%) gave a consistent pragmatic interpretation, 
(answering “false” to “Some elephants have trunks”), while the remaining 7 (37%) gave a consis-
tent logical interpretation of “some” (answering “true”, since some elephants do have trunks). The 
pragmatic interpretation group was also significantly slower (1064ms) than the logical interpreta-
tion group (647ms), and the delay was attributed to the time taken to process the scalar implicature. 
To summarize the ERP results, Noveck and Posada looked at the N400 response to the last 
word of each sentence, and found that underinformative items yielded a lower response relative to 
the obviously true and false items, indicating that the underinformative items were not perceived 
to be highly semantically anomalous, at least not in the time window under consideration. Com-
bined with the longer response time, the authors suggest that the results were due to a pragmatic 
process (or other decision-making process) that took place after the last word had been heard.   
However, there was no ERP difference between the participant interpretation groups, as one might 
have expected.  
Another study suggesting that adults do not always provide implicature-derived answers is 
Foppolo (2007).  Foppolo’s main focus is actually the idea that processing differences occur be-
tween different types of sentence structures, rather than different types of participants. Her ex-
periment, a picture-verification task with response time measures, used the logical connectives 
<and, or>.  The logical interpretation of “or” is inclusive or, that is, saying “A or B” means “A or 
B and no information about whether A and B”. On the pragmatic interpretation of “or” (referred to 
as exclusive or), saying “A or B” means “A or B but not A and B”. The pragmatic/exclusive or is 
thought to be derivable from the scalar implicature inherent in saying “or” rather than the stronger 
“and”. 
The experiment in Foppolo (2007) was designed to test whether scalar implicatures are costly 
to process in certain semantic contexts, e.g. Downward Entailing (DE).  Indeed, she found that 
when participants read a sentence in the DE context condition, they only accepted the pragmatic 
(exclusive “or”) interpretation 57% of the time. They were also significantly slower to accept it 
than reject it. When the sentence was in the non-DE context (easy) condition, there was a rela-
tively higher acceptance (87%) of the pragmatic (exclusive “or”) interpretation, and participants 
were slightly but not significantly slower to accept it than reject it.  
For our purposes, what is relevant about these results is that neither condition resulted in full 
acceptance of the pragmatic interpretation. As in previous studies, we see that adults do sometimes 
respond logically (i.e., as if they had not generated the implicature). Although Foppolo does not 
report the consistency of her participants, these results at least suggest that adults do not inevitably 
provide implicature-requiring answers, though (again as in the previous studies) the majority do.    
In sum, existing work suggests that, (i) on the whole, adults tend to have a preference for 
pragmatic interpretations, that is, those that reflect processing of scalar implicature, and (ii) adults 
tend to have a consistent preference for either pragmatic interpretations or logical interpretations. 
The reasons underlying the grouped or split behavior are not yet fully understood. In particular, 
one might ask whether the split results are due to individuals having varying amounts of process-
ing capacity, with lower-capacity comprehenders being less likely to engage in scalar implicature 
processing. On a related note, it could be the case that comprehenders vary in their threshold for 
Relevance, i.e., the point at which they decide that certain input is worthy of processing effort 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995), as suggested by Noveck and Posada (2003). It is important to note 
that both of these ideas rely on the assumption that comprehenders’ logical vs. pragmatic re-
sponses provide an accurate reflection of whether or not the scalar implicature was computed. 
However, as discussed in the following sections, the results from our experiment suggest that this 
is not necessarily true. As a whole, our findings indicate that participants tend to be aware of the 
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implicature regardless of their off-line responses, and suggest that the existence of participant re-
sponse groups should not be taken as evidence for fundamental processing differences.  
3  Experiment 
The present experiment used a new type of eyetracking experimental design for investigating the 
processing of scalar implicature. Existing visual-world eyetracking studies presented participants 
with multiple mini-scenes simultaneously which depicted pragmatic and logical interpretations of 
a sentence with a scalar term. By analyzing participants’ eye-movements to the different scenes, 
one can gain insights into which interpretations are being considered. 
 However, in our experiment, participants were only shown one visual scene at a time, and 
were asked to perform a picture-verification task. With this kind of design, we did not expect 
looks to any particular scene or object at any particular time. Instead, we wanted to test whether 
participants’ overall manner of observing the scene is distinct for underinformative vs. appropri-
ately informative scenarios. In addition, participants were able to accept or reject descriptions of 
appropriate and underinformative scenarios, providing us with the opportunity to analyze eye 
movements relative to response types.  
 The experiment had a 2x2 within-subjects design. We manipulated quantifier type (“Some” or 
“All”) and picture type (Match or NoMatch). To create pictures that either matched or mismatched 
the experimental sentences, we used two kinds of pictures, as shown in Figure 1. So-called “Pic-
ture-All” (PA) displays contain objects that are all the same color (e.g. the top and bottom pictures 
in Figure 1). In contrast, “Picture-Some” (PS) displays contained two groups of objects that differ 
in color, as shown by the middle two pictures in Figure 1. In all pictures, the objects depicted are 
multiple identical tokens of the same object (e.g. all apples). The two picture types were crossed 
with quantifier type (Quantifier-Some vs. Quantifier-All, abbreviated QS and QA), yielding the 
four conditions in Figure 1. Because we used a picture-verification paradigm, a participant only 
saw one of these pictures on a given trial. These four conditions can also be thought of in terms of 
whether or not the picture and the sentence match. We use the term “Picture Match” for conditions 
where the picture agrees with the quantifier (QAPA, QSPS conditions), and the term “Picture 
NoMatch” for conditions where the picture and the quantifier fail to agree (QAPS, QSPA).  
3.1   Methodology 
Twenty-four students from the University of Southern California participated in the experiment 
and received $10. We recorded eye movements using an SR Research Eyelink II head-mounted 
eyetracker sampling at 500 Hz.  
The experiment used 20 target items, which contained 5 or 7 occurrences of the same object.  
In the Picture-All conditions, all objects in the picture were identical. In the Picture-Some condi-
tions, the objects were identical except for color. As shown in Figure 1, in the Picture-Some condi-
tions, the objects were presented in contiguous groups of two different colors. In these kinds of 
pictures, there were always 3 “target” items (those that had the color named in the sentence) while 
the other 2 or 4 objects were a different color. This allowed us to avoid biasing participants to-
wards minority or majority choices. The target items were the majority in the 5-object pictures and 
the minority in the 7-object pictures. The 5-object pictures and 7-object pictures were seen in 
equal numbers by each participant. Images were counterbalanced such that target and non-target 
items appeared in each of the 8 potential locations in the layout (two at top, two at bottom, two at 
left, two at right) an equal number of times. The colors of the objects were unambiguous and natu-
ral for the object (e.g., apples were red and green, not purple.) All pictures were presented in color. 
The darker apples in Figure 1 were actually red and the lighter-gray apples were green.  
Each trial began with a sentence naming the objects in the display: “This is a picture of ap-
ples.” The second sentence was the critical target sentence, and varied across conditions as shown 
in Figure 1. The quantifier was not stressed.  
The experiment also included 40 filler items, none of which were underinformative, for a total 
of 60 trials per participant. 
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Condition Example sentences Example scene Expected  
answer 
Quantifier-All-Picture-
All (QAPA/Match) 
This is a picture of apples.   
All of them are red. 
 
Yes  
(good description) 
Quantifier-All- 
Picture-Some 
(QAPS/NoMatch) 
This is a picture of apples.   
All of them are red. 
 
No 
(not good description) 
Quantifier-Some- 
Picture-Some 
(QSPS/Match) 
This is a picture of apples.  
Some of them are red. 
 
Yes 
(good description) 
Quantifier-Some- 
Picture-All 
(QSPA/NoMatch) 
This is a picture of apples.  
Some of them are red. 
 
? 
Figure 1: Conditions and sample stimuli 
3.2  Procedure 
Participants’ eye movements were recorded as they looked at pictures and listened to the sen-
tences while engaged in a picture verification task. Participants were asked to indicate whether the 
sentences they heard were a “good description” of the corresponding picture, and responded “yes” 
(good description) or “no” (not a good description) by pressing buttons on an Eyelink input unit.  
Before the start of the experiment, participants were told that if the sentences seemed wrong, mis-
leading, or did not give enough information, they might be considered bad descriptions. However, 
participants were encouraged to use their own best judgment. 
4  Results 
In this section, we start by presenting information about participants’ yes/no responses and re-
sponse times, and then discuss the eye-movement data. In this paper, we focus specifically on (i) 
whether participants’ off-line responses legitimately indicate a split into logical interpretation re-
sponders and pragmatic interpretation responders, and (ii) whether/how such a split is reflected in 
response times, eye-movement patterns and general awareness of the implicature. Please see 
Tavano & Kaiser (to appear) for a more detailed discussion of the general results of this experi-
ment.  
4.1  Participant responses  
Condition %“Yes” responses 
QAPA 100% 
QAPS 0% 
QSPA 56% 
QSPS 97% 
Table 1: Percentage of participant responses of “Yes” (“Good description”), by condition 
Overall, participants’ yes/no responses show very clear patterns in three out of the four conditions. 
When the quantifier and picture match (QAPA and QSPS), we find an overwhelming number of 
“yes” answers (see Table 1).  The quantifier and picture do not match in the other two conditions, 
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QAPS and QSPA.  In the QAPS condition (“Some of them are red”, all are red in the picture), we 
find a clear majority of “no” responses, as expected. However, in the QSPA condition, where 
items were underinformative, the results were mixed. We expected that underinformative sen-
tences would not be considered to be a good description of a picture, especially since participants 
had been told that “not enough information” could be an example of a bad description. However, 
there were numerically more logical-interpretation “Yes” responses (67 of 119 responses, 56%) 
than pragmatic-interpretation “No” responses (52 of 119 responses, 43%) to these items. This con-
trasts with responses in previous experiments, which most often reflected a preference for the 
pragmatic interpretation in adults. 
 When we take a closer look at the source of these mixed responses, it becomes clear that they 
stem primarily from a split among our participants, rather than mixed behavior within individual 
participants. In fact, 22 out of 24 participants showed consistent behavior and gave the same an-
swer on 4 or 5 out of the 5 QSPA trials. Only 2 participants out of 24 were more variable. When 
we look more closely within the 22 consistent participants, we find that 9 participants are prag-
matic responders (consistently answering “No”), and 14 are logical responders (consistently an-
swering “Yes”).  
While previous experimenters have interpreted logical responses as evidence that some par-
ticipants did not process the implicature, it appears that these responses alone are not a good indi-
cator of this. Nearly all of our participants (22 of 24, 92%) expressed awareness of the implicature, 
either through the experiment responses (giving the pragmatic “No” response in the QSPA condi-
tion), or in debriefing after the experiment, or both. Participants who answered logically often vol-
unteered this information as part of an explanation for how they answered. We discuss the impli-
cations of these findings in more depth in Section 5.  
4.2  Response times  
In this section, we first consider participants’ overall response times, and then take a closer look at 
the response times in the underinformative QSPA condition.  
 
Condition  Overall RT (ms) 
QAPA 1165 
QAPS 1109 
QSPA 1527 
QSPS 1277 
Table 2: Overall response times by condition. 
Table 2 shows response times collapsed across yes/no responses. (We measured response 
times from the end of the second sentence (“Some of them are red”) to the time when the partici-
pant pressed the button to indicate their response.) Response times are slowest when the quantifier 
is “Some”. The slowest overall RT is in the QSPA condition, followed by the QSPS condition. 
The difference between the QSPA and QSPS conditions is significant (p < .05). In addition, com-
paring conditions where the picture is the same and the only difference is the quantifier, each 
“Some” condition is slower than the corresponding “All” condition (QSPA is slower than QAPA, 
QSPS is slower than QAPS; p’s < .05).  
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Figure 2: Response times for “yes” and “no” responses in the four conditions1  
 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the QSPA condition was the only one where partici-
pants were split in their responses. To better understand the nature of the slowdown in the QSPA 
condition, let us take a closer look at the response times for “yes” answers and “no” answers, rep-
resented by the light and dark bars in Figure 2 respectively. Figure 2 shows response times for all 
“yes” responses and the response times for all “no” responses, regardless of whether they were 
produced by a logical responder or a pragmatic responder. Looking at QSPA response times solely 
by response, we see that there is a difference between Yes and No responses: Yes/logical re-
sponses (1414 ms) were faster than No/pragmatic responses (1673 ms). An independent samples t-
test confirms that this difference is significant (p < .05).2  
 Interestingly, when we look at QSPA response time for participants grouped by their overall 
response tendency (including the response times for the one out-of-category response, for partici-
pants who were “4 out of 5” consistent), we find that average response times are almost exactly 
equal: YES/logical group: 1519 ms; NO/pragmatic group 1502 ms. Thus, this suggests that the 
slow-down for pragmatic responses takes place on the level of each individual response rather than 
on the level of pragmatic vs. logical responders. 
4.3  Eye movement results   
We hoped to gain insight into the real-time processing of scalar implicature ⎯ in particular, to 
better understand the split into pragmatic responders and logical responders ⎯ by analyzing par-
ticipants’ eye movements. In particular, we wanted to see whether participants’ overall manner of 
observing the scene is distinct for underinformative and appropriately informative situations. 
 As reported in Tavano and Kaiser (to appear), we computed the average inspection duration 
for each condition. An inspection was defined as the amount of time that participants spent look-
ing at each object, even if there were multiple fixations within its bounds. We looked at inspection 
durations in a time frame from the second half of the quantifier, where participants should have 
first been able to recognize the word, to the end of the trial. The average inspection duration was 
longer in Quantifier-Some conditions than in Quantifier-All conditions (significant by participants, 
p <.05, marginal by items, p <.06). Another kind of eye movement measure (switch latency) con-
                                                
1Note that, as shown in Table 1, there were a small number of “Yes” responses in the QAPS condition 
(0.8%) and a small number of “No” responses in the QSPS condition (3.3%). The response times of those 
rare responses are not included in Figure 2 as they are presumed to be errors.  
2However, the yes/no responses in the QSPA condition are not entirely independent, since, as previously 
mentioned, it occasionally happened that a person responded 4/5 times one way and 1/5 times the other.  
Since if we excluded these cases, there was not enough data to perform either an independent-sample or 
paired-sample t-test, this result should be regarded with some caution. 
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firms participants’ sensitivity to the distinction between “some” and “all”: In the Picture-Some 
conditions (when the picture depicted two color-groups of objects), participants were faster to look 
at the “other” group (defined relative to where they were looking at quantifier onset) when the 
quantifier was “some” than when it was “all” (p<.05).  
 Recall that the underinformative QSPA condition was the only one in which participants' re-
sponses showed a split into “yes” and “no” answers; other conditions showed an overwhelming 
preference for either “yes” or “no”. To obtain another measure of processing load in this condition, 
we conducted response-contingent analyses, where we looked at the number of inspections by the 
type of response. We found that in the 200-600 ms period after the end (offset) of the quantifier, 
participants in the Yes/logical group in the QSPA condition had significantly more inspections 
than participants in the No/pragmatic group (3.8 inspections vs. 2.4 inspections). Furthermore, 
inspections initiated in this time period led to an overall significantly longer summed inspection 
time for the Yes/logical group (2141 ms) than the No/pragmatic group (926 ms), though there was 
no significant difference in average inspection times. There were no differences in inspection 
count or inspection time when longer time periods in the QSPA condition were considered. 
5  Discussion  
Our experiment aimed to provide new data on how scalar implicature is processed, by means of an 
eyetracking experiment with a novel type of visual scene design. In this paper we particularly fo-
cus on a pattern that cropped up both in our study and a number of previous experiments, namely 
the observation that participants tend to split into two distinct kinds of responders, what we have 
termed pragmatic responders and logical responders. Given an underinformative utterance, a sub-
set of participants (the pragmatic responders) consistently performed the task in a way that seem-
ingly reflected the processing of a scalar implicature.  The remainder of participants (the logical 
responders) consistently responded as if they had not processed a scalar implicature.  We define a 
consistent responder as one who gave the same type of response in 4 or 5 out of 5 trials in a condi-
tion.  By this definition, only 2 out of the 24 participants in our experiment were inconsistent in 
their responses to underinformative sentences.  
  The questions that presently interest us are as follows: (i) Why should this response grouping 
occur? (ii) What can we conclude from it with regard to participants’ implicature processing? Spe-
cifically, do participants’ ultimate pragmatic vs. logical responses provide a reliable indication of 
whether or not they were computing the implicatures? 
Generally speaking, it seems that previous research often assumed that participants’ answers 
reflect their on-line processing (i.e., a logical response means that no implicature was computed, a 
pragmatic response means that the implicature was computed). However, our results suggest that 
participants’ off-line responses to an underinformative utterance may not be a reliable indicator of 
whether they have processed a scalar implicature for that utterance. This is because we found that 
nearly all of our participants, both logical and pragmatic responders, eventually expressed aware-
ness of the scalar implicature where “some” can mean “some but not all”.  
An interesting issue that merits further research is the question of when logical responders 
achieve this awareness. Our current data do not allow us to determine when this took place. For 
example, one might suggest that the logical responders did not process the implicature for early 
trials in the QSPA condition, and only thought of it during later trials or even during the debriefing.  
While this is possible, we think it is rather unlikely for two main reasons.  First, response times for 
first QSPA trials tended to be longer than for subsequent QSPA trials, for all responders. If gener-
ating an implicature results in a slowdown, as many researchers have suggested, then a slowdown 
on early trials does not fit with the idea that participants were failing to generate implicatures spe-
cifically on those early trials. Second, there are other indications of greater processing for the logi-
cal group (more inspections, longer inspection time) relative to the pragmatic group. Therefore, we 
suggest that logical and pragmatic responses do not clearly indicate whether participants actually 
processed an implicature or not. 
That said, however, our results also agreed with prior experiments in that response times for 
pragmatic responses were longer than those for logical responses. This result has commonly been 
taken as a sign that there is greater processing when scalar implicature is present. If we are claim-
ing that responses are not an indicator of implicature processing, what explains the longer prag-
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matic response times? We do not have a complete answer to this question, but feel it is important 
to point out that pragmatic response times are only longer when data is examined by response only, 
without regard to the type of responder. The logical responders and pragmatic responders actually 
had equal response times when examined by responder type (see Section 4.2). This suggests 
strongly that the division between logical and pragmatic responders is questionable. We refer 
again to Noveck and Posada’s (2003) suggestion that the existence of responder groups can be 
explained by Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995); the threshold for relevance (a.k.a. the 
cost for processing the implicature, relative to its informative value) was lower for some people 
than others. However, it may be that the threshold is not so firmly set for any individual partici-
pant, and may actually change over the course of the experiment. 
 Let us return to the initial question of why participant response grouping should occur. We 
would like to suggest that ⎯ at least in our experiment ⎯ the grouping did not occur in the way 
that has been previously assumed (i.e., depending on whether or not the implicature is generated).
 It is worth pointing out another relevant difference between the present study and previous 
ones: in earlier studies, adult participants most often responded pragmatically, whereas in our 
study, more participants were logical responders than pragmatic responders (14 vs. 9). In light of 
the original supposition that adults are usually pragmatic responders because of their greater proc-
essing capacity, the high proportion of logical responders seems very unexpected. In fact, there is 
no reason to believe that our participants had anything less than typical adult competence. If any-
thing, our participants, nearly all university students, including several graduate students, were 
likely to have high inference and language skills. We tentatively hypothesize that all our partici-
pants processed a scalar implicature in early QSPA trials, and that they subsequently made a deci-
sion about what type of response the experimenter expected, whether an underinformative descrip-
tion was a “good” one or not. The equal response times between responder groups (see Section 4.2) 
could thus be explained by the equal time it would have taken participants to recognize an under-
informative scenario and recall earlier their decision about how to respond to uninformative de-
scriptions. It is possible that the logical responders did not do this quite as soon as the pragmatic 
responders, but our sense is that there no crucial distinction between the two groups beyond this 
chance occurrence. 
Further research is needed to assess the validity of this account, and we cannot know whether 
this conclusion applies to other studies, as it would require a detailed analysis of responder-group 
data in each case. However, if the difference between pragmatic responders and logical responders 
is indeed a consequence of participants’ interpretations of what is expected in a particular experi-
mental setting, that would mean that the nature of experimental tasks/situations is of particular 
importance in evaluating scalar implicature processing, and must be looked at closely. 
6  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have discussed the results of an experiment that used visual-world eyetracking 
and response time measures to evaluate real-time processing of scalar implicature. In particular, 
we took a closer look at a result common to several studies, including ours, where participants, 
when faced with an underinformative utterance, tended consistently to give either a pragmatic 
response (reflecting scalar implicature processing) or a logical response (which did not reflect im-
plicature processing). Other experiments have provided robust evidence suggesting that children 
do not process scalar implicature in underinformative situations, and that adults usually do, but not 
always. For the minority of adults that respond logically, it has usually been taken to mean that, 
like children, they have not processed the scalar implicature. 
 Our results suggest that the correlation between participants’ responses and the generation of 
scalar implicatures is less straightforward. In fact, our data suggest that participants are aware of 
scalar implicature regardless of how they respond to underinformative sentences. We hypothesize 
that adults may in fact be responding according to a strategy related to the nature of the experi-
ment, or what they expect the experimenter wants, or what a “logical” person would say ⎯ but not 
necessarily according to whether they themselves have actually generated the implicature.  
 If participants’ off-line responses do not provide a reliable indication of whether or not they 
have generated an implicature, it appears that other tools are needed. The key would seem to be 
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the evaluation of off-line responses in concert with fine-grained on-line processing measures. Eye-
tracking is a promising methodology for this, and we hope that future eyetracking research will 
further our understanding of scalar implicature processing as well as the nature of and reasons for  
the logical/pragmatic split between participants. 
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